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The Inadequacies of the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act of 2015 in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence
BERT LATHROP†
The relentless accumulation of private consumer information through online services has
dramatically expanded the attack surface available to cyber-criminals and belligerent state actors
looking to either enrich themselves or disrupt digital service operations. In response to this
growing threat and despite sharp criticism from privacy advocates, Congress passed the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA) with the aim of enabling private parties
and the federal government to better protect themselves through improved availability of cyber
threat intelligence. This intelligence is generally derived from organizations’ observations of
activity on their systems and networks. CISA authorizes private entities, and state, local, and tribal
governments, to share cyber threat intelligence with the federal government and among
themselves. In exchange, participants are granted immunity from criminal and civil liability for
their acts under the statute, and the federal government publishes redacted subsets of the collected
intelligence.
Coincidentally, artificial intelligence (AI) has recently emerged as a technology showing great
promise in automating many tasks currently performed by humans, and cybersecurity analysis is
no exception. CISA, drafted concurrently with this emergence, lacks the data-sharing
authorizations necessary to leverage AI’s full utility. Deep learning, the AI technology showing
the most promise, requires vast amounts of data providing evidence of normal system and network
activity from which anomalous events associated with cyber-attacks can be differentiated. While
CISA authorizes the sharing of the requisite data for such analyses in limited circumstances, this
Note explores the opportunities AI affords cybersecurity practitioners, explains the shortcomings
of CISA with respect to enabling AI to approach its full potential in cybersecurity applications,
and offers a remedial proposal to those shortcomings.
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INTRODUCTION
As the new millennium dawned, “about half of all adults were already
online. Today, roughly nine-in-ten American adults use the [I]nternet.”1 Since
2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center
(IC3), “received more than 4 million victim complaints . . . . [In 2017 alone, the
IC3] received more than 300,000 complaints . . . with reported losses of more
than $1.4 billion.”2 In response to the escalating rate of Internet crime, circa
2011, Congress began reviewing a number of proposals aimed at improving the
availability of cyber threat intelligence to the private and public sectors.3
While considerable debate exist[ed] with regard to the best strategies and
methods for protecting America’s various cybersystems, one point of
“general agreement” among cyber-analysts [was] the perceived need for
enhanced and timely exchange of cyber threat intelligence both within the
private sector and between the private sector and the government.4

In December 2015, after much contentious debate at a policy level between
security and privacy advocates,5 and at the solution level between proponents of
various alternative bills,6 President Obama signed the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA) into law.7
To understand how CISA can affect cybersecurity effectiveness, it helps to
have a basic understanding of how the Internet is organized. The Internet is
generally composed of a multitude of private networks interconnected through
the services of Internet service providers, or ISPs, and other backbone network
providers. These many private networks are protected by cybersecurity
practitioners through the use of a cybersecurity infrastructure, which requires
detailed threat intelligence to allow bona fide users access to services while
barring likely nefarious actors from harming the organization’s systems.
Analogizing to castle defenses, CISA authorizes individual private castle owners
to share cyber threat intelligence with other castle owners and with the federal
government information regarding the identity of such nefarious actors, their
modus operandi, and how to defend against their attacks. It also authorizes castle

1. Internet/Broadband
Fact
Sheet,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(June
12,
2019),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/.
2. Latest Internet Crime Report Released: IC3 Says Victim Losses Exceeded $1.4 Billion in 2017, FBI
NEWS (May 7, 2018), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718).
3. ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43941, CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING:
LEGAL CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 43–58 (2015).
4. Id. at 3–4 (citing BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CYBER SECURITY TASK FORCE: PUBLIC-PRIVATE
INFORMATION SHARING 5 (July 2012), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Public-PrivateInformation-Sharing.pdf).
5. See infra Subpart I.B.3.
6. See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 43–58.
7. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–10 (2018). See Andy Greenberg, Congress Slips CISA into a Budget Bill That’s Sure
to Pass, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2015, 12:24 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/12/congress-slips-cisa-into-omnibusbill-thats-sure-to-pass/; Everett Rosenfeld, The Controversial “Surveillance” Act Obama Just Signed, CNBC
(Dec. 22, 2015, 12:34 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/22/the-controversial-surveillance-act-obama-justsigned.html.
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owners to monitor their respective castle walls, wall perimeters, and the space
within their individual castles for discreet evidence of activity, equivalent to
footprints in the snow that may provide clues about users’ activity, whether wellintended or not. CISA does not authorize any castle owner to send any such
evidence to other castle owners, but castle owners may authorize third parties—
presumably cybersecurity firms—to monitor those specific castles on behalf of
their owners. This last authorization positions such third parties to accumulate
and analyze evidence collected across all the castle defenses for which they are
responsible, thus providing them with a unique bird’s-eye view of footsteps left
in the snow not afforded to any individual castle owner unless they subscribe to
such a cybersecurity firm’s services.8
Although debates were very active between CISA proponents and privacy
advocacy organizations prior to the passage of CISA,9 comparatively little has
been written about it since.10 CISA was designed to address the government’s
and the private sector’s needs for sharing information related to perceived cyber
threats and related defensive measures, but it was not drafted with modern data
science in mind, particularly artificial intelligence (AI). This Note takes a critical
view of the authorizations and legal immunities afforded by CISA in light of the
unforeseen risks and opportunities introduced by the advent of AI and its
applications to the domain of cybersecurity.
Part I provides a primer on the cybersecurity vocabulary necessary to
appreciate the finer points of the argument of this Note, relevant provisions of
CISA, and the context in which that statute was enacted, including the cyber
threats our nation faced during the years leading up to its passage. Part II
provides a perspective on the post-CISA cybersecurity context, including the
ever-evolving cyber threat landscape, liability concerns that continue to chill
participation in cyber threat intelligence sharing despite the legal immunities
afforded by CISA, the advent of AI including its introduction into the cyber
threat mix, and staffing issues facing organizations attempting to defend
themselves in the context of an escalating cyber threat landscape. Part III
outlines a proposal calling for new legislation that would amend CISA by
expanding its data sharing authorization to include raw observational evidence
of system and network activity between non-federal entities, and by refining the
definition of personally identifiable information and limiting the sharing
authorization for such information. Using a review and analysis of a similar data
8. While such a limitation may seem unfortunate, a statutory interpretation of CISA helps understand the
tension between security and privacy interests that likely led to this limitation. See infra Subpart I.C.4.
9. The American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation actively argued against the
passage of this legislation. See infra Subpart I.B.3.
10. Westlaw indicates no activity before the courts in relation to CISA, and only two law journal articles
or notes appear to have been written about it. John Heidenreich, Note, The Privacy Issues Presented by the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 91 N.D. L. REV. 395 (2015) (discussing privacy concerns with CISA’s
data sharing authorizations); Jamil N. Jaffer, Carrots and Sticks in Cyberspace: Addressing Key Issues in the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, 67 S.C. L. REV. 585 (2016) (discussing shortcomings related to
the mechanics of execution of the functions authorized under CISA).
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sharing proposal in the context of the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) legislation, this Part further demonstrates that the proposed
data sharing enhancements are in the public interest, thus providing a
counterargument to the concerns that privacy advocates would likely raise.
Areas of additional possible research that are not within the scope of this
Note include, but are not limited to, privacy-preserving data mining techniques
in cybersecurity,11 policies such as retention periods and security requirements
to be applied to shared cyber threat intelligence data, and the logistics that should
enable non-federal entities in sharing data.
I. THE LANGUAGE AND CONTEXT OF CISA
This section provides a primer on the cybersecurity vocabulary necessary
to appreciate the finer points of this Note’s argument, as well as an overview of
the context of the enactment of CISA and some of its relevant provisions.
A. CYBERSECURITY—SELECT DEFINITIONS
One challenging aspect of understanding cyber law is the degree of
complexity of the technology and its unfamiliar jargon. Cybersecurity comes
with a dense vocabulary of its own, evidenced by the more than two-hundredpage information security glossary documented by the Information Technology
Laboratory of the National Institute of Standards & Technology.12 The following
are some definitions of terms useful for understanding CISA and its impact on
cybersecurity.
1.

Cybersecurity Infrastructure

Conceptually very broad, cybersecurity infrastructure “[i]ncludes
electronic information and communications systems and services and the
information contained in these systems and services. Information and
communications systems and services are composed of all hardware and
software that process, store, and communicate information, or any combination
of all of these elements.”13 The physical elements of a well-appointed
cybersecurity infrastructure include common servers and network routing and
switching components, but may also include special-purpose cybersecurity

11. See, e.g., SUMEET DUA & XIAN DU, DATA MINING AND MACHINE LEARNING IN CYBERSECURITY 177–
203 (2011).
12. See generally RICHARD KISSEL, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., NISTIR 7298, GLOSSARY OF
KEY INFORMATION SECURITY TERMS (2013) (archived publication). The National Institute of Standards and
Technology is an organization whose mission is “to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by
advancing . . . standards” in information technology. NIST General Information, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS &
TECH., https://www.nist.gov/director/pao/nist-general-information (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
13. KISSEL, supra note 12, at 58.
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appliances, such as firewalls,14 intrusion detection systems,15 or cloud-based
cybersecurity services, like file reputation services.16
2.

Cyber Threat Intelligence

In his research at the SANS Institute, Greg Farnham defined cyber threat
intelligence as “threat intelligence related to computers, networks and
information technology.”17 It is “the information and knowledge about an
adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or
understanding, [and] is the product that provides battlespace awareness.”18
Cyber threat intelligence is produced through the analysis of large
quantities of raw data and information, producing relevant, actionable
intelligence, but raw data and information alone do not constitute cyber threat
intelligence.19 Depending on the form of analysis used to produce it, cyber threat
intelligence falls into three broad categories: strategic, tactical, and
operational.20
“Strategic threat intelligence is a bird’s-eye view of an organization’s
threat landscape. Not concerned with specific actors, indicators, or attacks, it
instead aims to help high-level strategists understand the broader impact of
business decisions [on the cybersecurity posture of an organization].”21
Tactical threat intelligence provides information about the tactics, techniques,
and procedures . . . used by threat actors to achieve their goals (e.g., to
compromise networks, exfiltrate data, and so on). It’s intended to help defenders
understand how their organization is likely to be attacked, so they can determine
whether appropriate detection and mitigation mechanisms exist or whether they
need to be implemented.22

“Operational threat intelligence relates to specific attacks or campaigns. It
helps defenders understand the nature, intent, and timing of a specific
attack . . . provides insight into the nature and sophistication of the group(s)
responsible,”23 and focuses on the discrete data elements that identify threats to
an organization’s information processing infrastructure, applications, and data.

14. Id. at 79.
15. Id. at 104.
16. See, e.g., TITANIUMCLOUD: File Reputation, REVERSINGLABS, https://www.reversinglabs.com/
products/file-reputation-service (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
17. GREG FARNHAM, TOOLS AND STANDARDS FOR CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS 8 (2013),
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/warfare/tools-standards-cyber-threat-intelligence-projects34375.
18. Id. (citing EDWARD WALTZ, INFORMATION WARFARE PRINCIPLES AND OPERATIONS (1998)).
19. Zane Pokorny, What Is Threat Intelligence? Definition and Examples, RECORDED FUTURE (Apr. 30,
2019), https://www.recordedfuture.com/threat-intelligence-definition/.
20. Id.
21. How Strategic Threat Intelligence Informs Better Security Decisions, RECORDED FUTURE (Sept. 13,
2018), https://www.recordedfuture.com/strategic-threat-intelligence/.
22. Id.
23. How Operational Threat Intelligence Blocks Attacks Before They Happen, RECORDED FUTURE (Sept.
25, 2018), https://www.recordedfuture.com/operational-threat-intelligence/.
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A key distinction between operational and strategic cyber threat
intelligence is that the former endeavors to discover and catalog nefarious
actors’ technical specifics including IP addresses, email addresses, or modus
operandi to later inhibit any cyber-attacks those actors may attempt to perpetrate,
whereas the latter is a narrative of the aspects of an organization that would
likely cause, or at least promote, the existence of a threat without knowing of
any specific threat attributes.
If the computer systems and special purpose appliances that make up an
organization’s physical cybersecurity infrastructure and the cybersecurityspecific applications hosted by those systems altogether are the engines that
power cyber-defense capability, then it is easy to think of operational threat
intelligence as the data necessary to direct or target the efforts of those engines.
a.

Cyber Threat Indicators (CTIs)

A type of operational cyber threat intelligence, CTIs are the sets of data
elements necessary to describe or identify a threat or risk to computer systems
or networks. They may include any combination of an identifiable pattern of24:
•
•
•
•

malicious network reconnaissance activity,25
a malicious cyber command and control,26
a method for defeating security controls,27
a security vulnerability,

24. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FINAL PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE RECEIPT OF
CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 13 (2016) [hereinafter
DHS & DOJ].
25. See generally H. P. Sanghvi & M. S. Dahiya, Cyber Reconnaissance: An Alarm Before Cyber Attack,
63 INT’L J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 36 (2013).
26. Botnets are autonomous, drone-like programs that, once infiltrated and installed in a target
environment, act under the direction of a malicious cyber command and control (C&C) that instructs them
through communication pathways that range from the very simple to the arbitrarily complex. E.g., GameOver
Zeus Botnet Disrupted: Collaborative Effort Among International Partners, FBI NEWS (last updated July 11,
2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/gameover-zeus-botnet-disrupted; see DUA & DU, supra note 11, at
209–11 (2011) (detailing, in section 9.1.2, general characteristics of botnet detection and eradication methods);
DHS & DOJ, supra note 24, at 14. An initial bot is generally introduced into the target organization through
some form of malicious code attack, for example, a phishing campaign that infects one or more computers in the
target network. Once introduced, the bot spreads through the target computer network like a virus, replicating
itself across computer systems by leveraging one or more known system vulnerabilities. The bots then persist
on the infected systems, awaiting the receipt of instructions from the malicious C&C, whether by reaching back
out periodically to a pre-configured URL or IP address, see KISSEL, supra note 12, at 104, or indirectly through
another infected system as with the GameOver Zeus botnet. A CTI documenting the details of a botnet would,
of course, include such details as the malicious code CTI that introduces the botnet, the URL(s) and/or IP
addresses to which the bots connect or the algorithm by which they calculate these at any given moment, and a
narrative describing the behavior and nefarious effects of the botnet. This definition is not intended to provide a
complete typology of possible botnet configurations, but rather to demonstrate that URLs and IP addresses are
fundamental to the description of a botnet CTI.
27. See KISSEL, supra note 12, at 175–76.
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• a method for causing a legitimate user to unwittingly defeat a security
control,28
• the actual or potential harm caused by a cybersecurity incident including any
data exfiltrated as a result,29 or
• “any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of such attribute is
not otherwise prohibited by law.”30

The discrete data elements used to document a CTI may include indicators
of compromise (IOCs)31 or any other raw data necessary to adequately complete
the characterization of the threat or risk.
CTIs may describe any matter of cyber-risk, including malicious code or
malware,32 a phishing attack, or a botnet. A CTI is a complex data structure that

28. A user may unwittingly defeat an organization’s security controls by falling victim to a phishing attack.
See KISSEL, supra note 12, at 142; see also DUA & DU, supra note 11, at 208 (describing, at section 9.1.1, a
phishing attack resulting in the introduction of malware onto a user’s system). Such attacks may be broad, that
is, sent to a large email list purchased on the black market, or narrowly targeted at select individuals within an
organization after extensive research into their personal details, which is considered a more insidious activity
known as spear phishing. E.g., Sean Michael Kerner, Sony Hackers Used Apple ID Phishing Scheme,
Researchers Claim at RSA, EWEEK (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.eweek.com/security/sony-hackers-used-appleid-phishing-scheme-researchers-claim-at-rsa. Invariably, the email will contain a URL, see Memorandum from
Tim Berners-Lee, et al., on Uniform Resource Locators (URL) to Networking Working Group (Dec. 1994),
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1738.txt, or a website link the receiver is invited to click, which then takes her to a
malicious website soliciting her personal details. E.g., The Phishing Email That Hacked the Account of John
Podesta, CBS NEWS (Oct. 28, 2016, 11:43 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-phishing-email-thathacked-the-account-of-john-podesta/. A phishing attack CTI would include the email envelope or header
including the sender’s email address, the email body including the malicious URL, and a narrative of the
behavior of the malicious website or resource linked to the malicious URL. Methods for gathering the data
necessary to populate a phishing CTI include human intelligence, for example, the email recipient comparing
the URL to what he knows to be valid in context and reporting a suspicious email to his cybersecurity team;
policy-based screening automation, that is, the email recipient clicks the URL link and is protected by
infrastructure designed to block and report against entire classes of high-risk Internet domain names, see, e.g.,
Newly Observed Domains: Threat Protection from New Domains, FARSIGHT SECURITY,
https://www.farsightsecurity.com/solutions/threat-intelligence-team/newly-observed-domains/ (last visited Jan.
24, 2020), or detailed forensic analysis of a particular phishing attack a specific user has experienced.
29. See
Exfiltration:
The
Adversary
Is
Trying
to
Steal
Data,
MITRE,
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (providing a definition for exfiltration and
examples of techniques).
30. See DHS & DOJ, supra note 24, at 13.
31. See infra Subpart I.A.1.c.
32. A CTI describing malicious code or malware would likely include such IOCs as the name of the file
containing the malicious code, the file size, and a uniquely identifying signature of the file. See DUA & DU,
supra note 11, at 208 (describing, in section 9.1.1, a phishing attack resulting in the introduction of malware
onto a user’s system); see also KISSEL, supra note 12, at 84, 118. In such a CTI, IOCs would likely be
accompanied by a narrative detailing the nefarious behavior of the malware. E.g., Reports, VIRUSTOTAL,
https://support.virustotal.com/hc/en-us/articles/115002719069-Reports (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (detailing the
elements of a sample malicious code attack signature). A malware CTI generally results from a static analysis
of the file content and/or dynamic observation of the malicious code’s behavior in an isolated execution
environment
or
sandbox.
E.g.,
Active
File
Decomposition,
REVERSINGLABS,
http://reversinglabs.com/technology/active-file-decomposition.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (detailing
technology capable of decomposing a file down to discrete instructions in order to detect malicious fragments
within); Symantec Content & Malware Analysis, SYMANTEC, https://www.symantec.com/products/atp-contentmalware-analysis (last visited Jan. 24, 2020); see also KISSEL, supra note 12, at 168 (detailing file behavior
analysis in a quarantined computing environment).
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often requires significant analysis before a cybersecurity analyst can complete
its documentation. CTIs are composed of IOCs, which may contain personally
identifiable information (PII),33 and are accompanied by a narrative putting
those IOCs in the context of the threat described.
Once compiled, CTIs are shared with peers either directly or through
community sharing schemes, including the federal government as authorized
under CISA.34 CTI recipients, now informed of the characteristics of a given
cyber threat, can use this information to develop defensive measures and
configure them into their systems and cybersecurity infrastructure to defeat the
threat detailed in the CTI.35
b.

Defensive Measures (DMs)

Like CTIs, DMs are also a form of operational cyber threat intelligence.
Once a CTI is documented, a related DM might also be documented, detailing
inhibiting or defensive tactics to protect against the threat defined in the CTI, if
those details are known. For example, a DM for a phishing threat would likely
include instructions to simply inhibit any outbound connection requests to the
malicious URL detailed in the CTI for that phishing attempt. Similarly, the DM
for a particular element of malicious code might include clues for detecting the
file, such as the unique signature identifying the file, and instructions for placing
the malicious elements of that code in quarantine on infected systems. Sharing
DMs among cyber threat analysts allows the research performed by one to be
leveraged by many, thus improving the efficiency of devising and deploying
proven cyber defenses.

33. For example, email or IP addresses. Personally identifiable information (PII) definitions vary by
jurisdiction. Notable definitions include those of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA). The GDPR defines “personal data” as:
[A]ny information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an
identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural
or social identity of that natural person.”
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of
Natural Persons With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33. The CCPA defines
“personal information” as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with,
or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household,” and supplements
that definition with a non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of information that constitute personal
information. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2019). The inclusion of PII in CTIs fuels the debate
between privacy advocates who would prefer that no such data be shared for the sake of privacy, and security
minded practitioners who suggest that the effectiveness of cybersecurity defenses is enhanced by the availability
of data that provide situational awareness. See infra Subpart I.B.3.
34. See infra Subpart I.C.
35. See infra Subpart I.A.1.b.
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Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Greg Farnham defines IOCs as “one of the most easily actionable types of
[cyber threat intelligence] . . . . Some of the most commonly used IOCs are IP
addresses, domain names, uniform resource locators (URLs) and file
[signatures].”36 They are the results of detailed analyses sufficient to draw a
judgment of potential threat or risk. As IOCs are attack-specific, they are not
particularly useful or actionable absent the context of the attack where they were
observed. For example, an email address in and of itself is not actionable, but
that same address can be added to an email blocking list as a DM if that email
address has been identified as the source of a phishing attack. Further examples
of the operational use of IOCs include using a list of file signatures associated
with files known to contain malicious code to inform an anti-virus application
or using a blacklist of threatening URLs to inhibit user connections to the
Internet resources associated with those URLs. IOCs are critical to cyber
defense, as they are the necessary data cyber-analysts use to configure the
cybersecurity infrastructure guarding an organization’s systems and networks.
3.

Raw Observational Data (ROD)

It is common practice in network and data center operations to log detailed
user system and network activity (raw observational data or ROD). While ROD
is not a concept exclusive to cybersecurity or to its vocabulary, for the purposes
of this Note, ROD is defined as the data collected as trace evidence of activity
on an organization’s systems and networks. Systems operations support staff and
cybersecurity analysts routinely analyze ROD in support of their respective
functions, including real-time surveillance activities, forensic investigations,
and the documentation of CTIs and cyber-crime reports for law enforcement.37
One may liken ROD, which may include email addresses, domain names,
URLs, or IP addresses, to footprints left in the snow by those interacting with an
organization’s systems and networks. As these footprints may be evidence of the
identity of the actor communicating with the organization in that moment, they
can be very useful to a cybersecurity analyst to track down a nefarious actor who
has infiltrated an organization’s network and system resources, or otherwise
attribute a cyber-crime to its perpetrator. Unlike a CTI, ROD does not associate
any judgment of risk or attribution with the data elements within it; its presence
in a log file or data stream is a mere fact of recorded system and network activity
history.
A specific example of ROD with direct applicability to cybersecurity is
“passive DNS” data,38 evidence of a query-response exchange between an
36. FARNHAM, supra note 17, at 8.
37. Id. at 9.
38. See Cricket Liu, Strengthen Your Network Security with Passive DNS, INFOWORLD (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://www.infoworld.com/article/2994016/network-security/strengthen-your-network-security-with-passivedns.html; see also FLORIAN WEIMER, PASSIVE DNS REPLICATION (2005), https://www.first.org/conference/
2005/papers/florian-weimer-paper-1.pdf.
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organization’s network infrastructure and the global Domain Name System
(DNS).39 Such exchanges happen routinely as an organization’s users attempt to
access Internet resources previously unknown to the organization’s network.40
Being able to look retrospectively at the evidence of such exchanges is
invaluable to investigating a cyber-attack,41 such as in the case of a phishing
attack where a new nefarious domain name was presented to an unsuspecting
user, inviting the user to access the domain to initiate the phishing attack.42
While CISA specifically authorizes the sharing of CTIs and DMs among
various stakeholders, it does not authorize the sharing of ROD except in the very
narrow circumstance of an authorized third-party network monitoring activity.43
The specific reasons for the exclusion of such valuable data from the sharing
authorization provisions are not known with precision, but the compromise
between security- and privacy-minded arguments likely explain it.44
Under CISA, unless necessary to properly document a CTI or DM, PII
must be redacted before either type of report is shared.45 On the other hand, as
ROD most often documents evidence of a specific user’s system and network
activity, it must contain a modicum of PII lest it be rendered valueless. As a
result, organizations collecting ROD and their system users harbor much greater
privacy concerns regarding ROD as its content is often more sensitive than that
of CTIs or DMs from which all unnecessary PII must be redacted under CISA.46
B. CYBERSECURITY RISKS PRIOR TO 2015 AND THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE
1.

Cyber-Crimes Moved to the Headlines

During the years leading up to the fall of 2015, a number of high-profile
cyber-attacks were perpetrated against prominent U.S. corporations and
government agencies.47 The most prominent of these attacks, the Anthem data
39. Memorandum from Paul Mockapetris on Domain Names—Implementation and Specification to
Network Working Group (Nov. 1987), https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt.
40. Id.
41. Commercial cybersecurity companies harvest Passive DNS data across many organizations’ networks
to create a database providing a time-series, composite view of the content of the global Domain Name System
in support of complex, cross-network forensic investigations. See e.g., Plug into the World’s Largest DNS
Intelligence Solution: DNSDB, FARSIGHT SECURITY, https://www.farsightsecurity.com/solutions/dnsdb/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2020). Such databases do not provide any form of risk scoring associated with an IOC, but may
answer questions regarding a suspect domain name, including IP addresses that have historically hosted the
domain, or the set of other domains that are or have been hosted on a same IP network address range, that is,
known associates in law enforcement parlance. Id.
42. See supra note 28 (explaining the risks associated with phishing attacks).
43. See infra Subpart I.C (providing an overview of the relevant provisions of CISA).
44. See infra Subpart I.B.3 (outlining the controversies surrounding the passage of CISA and the resulting
compromise provisions of the bill).
45. See infra Subpart I.C.
46. See infra Subpart I.C.
47. E.g., Jim Finkle, Hackers Raid eBay in Historic Breach, Access 145 Million Records, REUTERS (May
21, 2014, 8:01 PM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ebay-password/hackers-raid-ebay-in-historic-breach-
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breach perpetrated by two Chinese nationals, was documented in a federal grand
jury indictment unsealed in 2019.48 Tens of millions of credit card numbers were
stolen in a single attack on the Target store chain,49 and several such attacks were
successful against a variety of large store chains and retail banks.50 Agents acting
on behalf of the North Korean government allegedly attacked the Bank of
Bangladesh, making away with $81 million.51 And “[i]n perhaps the most
infamous cyberattack of 2014 . . . Sony Pictures Entertainment suffered a
‘significant system disruption’ as a result of a ‘brazen cyber-attack’ [also
attributed to the North Korean government] that resulted in the leaking of
personal details of thousands of Sony employees.”52
The public felt the impact of these cyber-attacks directly as they
jeopardized health records, financial data, or other private information of
hundreds of millions of U.S. residents. As a result, the reality of cyber-risk
moved front and center in the public debate. Although cybersecurity
practitioners continued to cite current and former employees most frequently as
the culprits for cybersecurity incidents,53 this time period saw a marked
acceleration in attacks attributable to organized crime and nation-state actors.54
2.

Early Attempts to Implement Legislative Solutions Fail

Between 2011 and 2014, a number of bills aimed at providing a statutory
framework for the exchange of cyber threat intelligence between the private
sector and the federal government were introduced in both houses of Congress.55

access-145-million-records-idUKKBN0E10ZL20140522; Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Breach Data of 4 Million
Federal Workers, WASH. POST (June 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/chinese-hackers-breach-federal-governments-personnel-office/2015/06/04/889c0e52-0af7-11e5-95fdd580f1c5d44e_story.html?utm_term=.2ac; Ellen Nakashima, Hackers Breach Some White House Computers,
WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hackersbreach-federal-governments-personnel-office/2015/06/04/889c0e52-0af7-11e5-95fdd580f1c5d44e_story.html;
Gregory Wallace, Target Credit Card Hack: What You Need to Know, CNN MONEY (Dec. 23, 2013, 11:43 AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2013/12/22/news/companies/target-credit-card-hack/index.html; Michael Winter, Home
Depot
Hackers
Used
Vendor
Log-On
to
Steal
Data,
E-mails,
USA
TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/11/06/home-depot-hackers-stolen-data/18613167/ (last
updated Nov. 7, 2014, 8:57 AM).
48. Nicole Perlroth, Two From China Are Charged in 2014 Anthem Data Breach, N.Y. TIMES (May 9,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/technology/anthem-hack-indictedbreach.html?searchResultPosition=1.
49. See Wallace, supra note 47.
50. See supra note 47.
51. Criminal Complaint at 3, United States v. Park Jin Hyok, No. MJ18-1479 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2018).
52. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting Press Release, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Message for Current
and Former Sony Pictures Employees and Dependents, and for Production Employees (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://www.sonypictures.net/SPE_Cyber_Notification.pdf?) (citing Amelia Smith, Sony Cyber Attack One of
Worst in Corporate History, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 4, 2014, 1:14 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/sony-cyberattack-worst-corporate-history-thousands-files-are-leaked-289230).
53. PWC, MANAGING CYBER RISKS IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE GLOBAL
STATE OF INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY 2015 13 (2014).
54. See id. at 15.
55. See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 43 n.345.
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For example, in late 2011, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act
(CISPA) was introduced to the U.S. House of Representatives.56 Despite a strong
consensus and bipartisan approval in the U.S. House of Representatives,57 the
U.S. Senate defeated CISPA through a filibuster, citing its lack of specific
protection for critical infrastructure.58
The Snowden disclosures of 2013 appeared to dramatically change the
political climate surrounding cybersecurity legislation.59 The public had learned
of the federal government’s widespread data collection and surveillance
strategies, which cast a notable chill on any bills advocating the sharing of cyber
threat intelligence with the federal government.60 Further, those disclosures
incentivized privacy advocates to redouble their lobbying efforts.61 As a result,
until 2015, bills aiming to authorize the sharing of cyber threat intelligence with
the federal government were defeated on the grounds of privacy concerns, which
were acknowledged by both sides of the aisle and by President Obama.62
3.

CISA Enacted in 2015 Despite Significant Privacy Concerns

Despite its many failed attempts to pass legislation to improve the nation’s
cyber threat intelligence capabilities, Congress continued its efforts to find a
solution. As indicated in the Senate report on the activities of the Select
Committee on Intelligence covering the period of January 6, 2015 to January 2,
2017, “[b]uilding on the [Intelligence] Committee-reported Cyber Information
Sharing Act (CISA) during the 113th Congress, the Committee reported an
updated Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (S. 754) on March 17,
2015. The bill included authorizations, procedures, and protections to encourage
public/private collaboration on cybersecurity threats.”63
The shaping and ultimate passage of CISA proved particularly
controversial.64 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce came out in favor of the bill,
56. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. (2011).
57. Robert Pear, House Votes to Approve Disputed Hacking Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/us/politics/house-defies-veto-threat-on-hacking-bill.html.
58. Michael S. Schmidt, Cybersecurity Bill Is Blocked in Senate by G.O.P. Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
2, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/us/politics/cybersecurity-bill-blocked-by-gop-filibuster.html.
59. See Ewen MacAskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded: What the Revelations Mean For You,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-filessurveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1.
60. Robert X. Cringely, NSA, PRISM, and CISPA: The Conspiracy Behind the Conspiracy, INFOWORLD
(June 14, 2013), https://www.infoworld.com/article/2611569/nsa--prism--and-cispa--the-conspiracy-behindthe-conspiracy.html.
61. See,
e.g.,
CISPA
Is
Back,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://action.eff.org/o/9042/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=9048 (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
62. See Kate Knibbs, The New CISPA Bill Is Literally Exactly the Same as the Last One, GIZMODO (Jan.
14, 2015, 2:25 PM), https://gizmodo.com/the-new-cispa-bill-is-literally-exactly-the-same-as-the-1679496808;
Michelle Richardson, Opposition to CISPA Is Growing!, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 24, 2012, 1:01 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/opposition-cispa-growing.
63. S. REP. NO. 115-13, at 2 (2017).
64. See Andy Greenberg, CISA Security Bill: An F for Security But an A+ for Spying, WIRED (Mar. 20,
2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/03/cisa-security-bill-gets-f-security-spying/; Andy Greenberg,
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suggesting that it was the progress the United States required to improve the
security of its businesses and government.65 Privacy advocacy groups such as
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) each expressed strong opposition to the bill, citing grave
privacy concerns with CISA’s new data sharing authorizations.66 A group of
cybersecurity professionals and other technologists joined the chorus of
dissenters, suggesting that the privacy risks introduced by CISA were not worth
the limited value of CTIs and DMs to their cybersecurity analysis needs.67
Likewise, a diverse group of large Silicon Valley tech companies, which
safeguard a great deal of private consumer data, were eager to demonstrate their
support for individual privacy rights by lobbying against the bill.68
On April 15, 2015, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
recommended the passage of CISA.69 The divergent opinions of securityconscious and privacy-conscious stakeholders were clearly reflected in the
committee report. On the one hand, Senators Heinrich and Hirono felt compelled
to note that, while they supported the “broad aims” of the bill, it
[P]rovides more restraints, guidance, and oversight than did the earlier draft
version of the legislation, including a narrowing of the definition and
authorized use of defensive measures, fewer exceptions for liability
protections for information shared outside of the DHS portal, and more limits
on how cyber threat information is used.70

On the other hand, Senator Wyden voiced his dissent in opposition to the bill,
suggesting he believed the bill’s “insufficient privacy protections will lead to
large amounts of personal information being shared with the government even
when that information is not needed for cybersecurity. This could include email

Congress Slips CISA into a Budget Bill That’s Sure to Pass, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2015, 12:24 PM) [hereinafter
Greenberg, Congress Slips CISA], https://www.wired.com/2015/12/congress-slips-cisa-into-omnibus-bill-thatssure-to-pass/; Peter Hess, Controversial New Cybersecurity Law May Compromise Privacy, SCIENCELINE (Jan.
24, 2016), https://scienceline.org/2016/01/controversial-new-cybersecurity-law-may-compromise-privacy/.
65. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber’s Donohue: ‘CISA is a Positive Step
Forward on Cybersecurity’ (Oct. 27, 2015, 5:15 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-sdonohue-cisa-positive-step-forward-cybersecurity.
66. Letter from Karin Johansen, Dir., Wash. Legislative Office, & Gabriel Rottman, Legislative
Counsel/Policy Advisor, to U.S. Senators, Vote NO on the Motion for Cloture for S. 754, the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Oct. 22, 2015) https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-vote-recommendation-urgingsenate-vote-no-cloture-motion-s-754-cybersecurity-information; Mark Jaycox, EFF Opposes Cybersecurity Bill
Added to Congressional End of Year Budget Package, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., (Dec. 18, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/12/statement-finalized-congressional-cybersecurity-bill.
67. Letter from Ben Adida et al., to Senators Feinstein & Burr, and Representatives Schiff, Nunez, &
McCaul (Apr. 16, 2015) http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/technologists_info_sharing_bills_letter_w_
exhibit.pdf.
68. See, e.g., Sam Thielman, Apple, Google and Twitter Among 22 Tech Companies Opposing CISA Bill,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/21/apple-google-and-twitteramong-22-tech-companies-opposing-cisa-bill (“The trust of our customers means everything to us and we don’t
believe security should come at the expense of their privacy.”).
69. S. REP. NO. 114-32, at 1 (2015).
70. Id. at 17.
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content, financial records, and a wide variety of other personal information.”71
These senators felt compelled to register their respective points, which live at
opposite ends of the spectrum in the security-privacy balance, suggesting that
the content of the bill was a compromise of opposing views.
Nevertheless, on October 27, 2015, the Senate passed CISA by a vote of
seventy-four to twenty-one and, in an effort to end debate and overcome a
threatened presidential veto, “it was incorporated into and became law as part of
H.R. 2029 [the $1.1 trillion 2016 omnibus funding bill] on December 18,
2015.”72 Despite the chilled climate brought on by the Snowden disclosures, the
escalating headlines describing one more devastating cyber-crime after the next
likely incentivized Congress to act, passing a particularly controversial piece of
legislation.
C. RELEVANT CISA PROVISIONS
CISA establishes a cyber threat intelligence sharing scheme between the
federal government, and private entities, state, local, and tribal governments (all
together “non-federal entities” or “NFEs”),73 and among NFEs. Program
participants are provided with broad liability protection for their actions under
the statute.
1.

Role of the Department of Homeland Security

CISA designates the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the
agency with operational responsibility for a cybersecurity information sharing
service.74 Through this service, the DHS is required to process the receipt of
[CTIs] and [DMs] from NFEs “through an automated real-time exchange,
electronic mail or media, or a website interface.”75 Further, the DHS is required
to publish, in real-time if possible, various subsets of the cyber threat intelligence
it receives under CISA to NFEs and appropriate federal agencies,76 depending
on their respective levels of security clearance.77
2.

Authorization to Share CTIs and DMs and to Monitor Systems

Under CISA, NFEs are authorized to share CTIs and DMs with the federal
government and/or with other NFEs for cybersecurity purposes only.78 They are

71. Id. at 21.
72. S. REP. NO. 115-13, at 3 (2017); see also 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–10 (2018); Greenberg, Congress Slips
CISA, supra note 64; Everett Rosenfeld, The Controversial “Surveillance” Act Obama Just Signed, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/22/the-controversial-surveillance-act-obama-just-signed.html (last updated
Dec. 22, 2015, 2:50 PM).
73. 6 U.S.C. § 1501(14).
74. See id. §§ 1501(6–7), 1504(c).
75. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(c); DHS & DOJ, supra note 24, at 3.
76. 6 U.S.C. § 1501(3).
77. Id. § 1502.
78. Id. § 1503(c).
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also authorized to operate DMs within their respective systems and networks,79
and to monitor their own systems and networks and the systems and networks
of other NFEs or federal entities, provided they are authorized by those entities
to do so.80 The term “monitor” is given an expansive meaning under CISA,
including “to acquire, identify, or scan, or to possess, information that is stored
on, processed by, or transiting an information system,”81 for cybersecurity
purposes.82 CISA defines a cybersecurity purpose as “the purpose of protecting
an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or
transiting an information system from a cybersecurity threat or security
vulnerability.”83 Therefore, assuming that cybersecurity purposes would
naturally include cyber-analysts’ analyses of data collected through authorized
monitoring activities, a textualist interpretation of these provisions suggests that
the CISA-authorized monitoring includes, for cybersecurity purposes, the
collection, possession, and analysis of ROD.84
3.

Immunity from Suit for Acts of Sharing or Monitoring

Andrew Nolan reported to Congress that “[p]erhaps the most heavily
debated legal issue respecting cyber-information sharing legislation is how to
adequately minimize the host of liability issues that may arise for those in the
private sector that may wish to disclose cyber-intelligence to outsiders.”85
Through its authorization for NFEs to share CTIs and DMs that may contain
private information, CISA creates liability risk for program participants. Actions
could be brought under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
with relation to the monitoring of systems and networks and under federal or
state privacy laws with relation to data being shared. Further, under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, NFEs could incur criminal or civil liability for the sharing of CTIs
and DMs as those actions could be construed as a “group boycott, or concerted
refusals by traders to deal with other traders.”86
To address this issue, CISA includes liability protection for participants
sharing cyber threat intelligence under the statute. This immunity is an essential
provision of the statute, as no reasonable NFE would participate in the program
otherwise. A tailored approach to providing such liability protection may well
have been impossible to craft, as drafters would have needed to apply
forethought into all the legal theories under which NFEs could have incurred

79. Id. § 1503(b).
80. Id. § 1503(a).
81. Id. § 1501(13).
82. Id. § 1503(a)(1).
83. Id. § 1501(4).
84. See supra Subpart I.A.3 (providing a detailed definition of ROD). As neither Westlaw nor Lexis show
any cases citing to any CISA provisions at this time, the interpretation of the CISA text has yet to be argued
before the courts.
85. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 48.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
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liability for their acts under CISA.87 Therefore, Congress chose to apply “broad
immunity” from criminal and civil liability for NFEs’ lawful acts under CISA.88
4.

No Authorization for the Sharing of ROD

Conspicuously missing from the list of authorized acts under CISA-defined
monitoring are the acts of giving or sharing of ROD—an NFE sending data
already collected by itself through a monitoring process of its own network to a
third-party.89 Although the statute authorizes third-parties, presumably
cybersecurity companies, which are NFEs in their own right, to harvest ROD
through monitoring activities and to analyze that data for cybersecurity
purposes,90 it does not explicitly authorize NFEs or federal agencies to send their
data to such third-parties for that same purpose.91
This confusing interpretation of the data sharing authorized under CISA is
evidence of ambiguity in the meaning of the statute. In case of a dispute, the
courts would likely first apply a textualist interpretation through the plain
meaning rule.92 Thus, in the absence of an explicit authorization for an NFE to
send ROD previously collected on its own network to a third party, a textualist
interpretation of CISA-defined monitoring requires that we infer that Congress
never intended to authorize an NFE to send ROD that it collected on its own
systems. There are good reasons for such an interpretation, as consumers’
privacy rights could easily be trampled if every NFE was authorized to send any
data collected on its own systems, even if that authorization was explicitly
limited to cybersecurity purposes only. On the other hand, drawing a textualist
distinction between authorizing a third-party to monitor an NFE’s systems and
thereby harvesting and transporting any data so captured, and an NFE
monitoring its own systems and then sending that data to another NFE, that is, a
cybersecurity firm—the activity not explicitly authorized—seems like a
distinction without a difference. In both cases, the ROD is harvested in the same
place and would likely end up in the possession of the same third-party. The
only subtle difference rests in which party initiates and performs the initial data
collection.
In the absence of a clear textual meaning of a statute, one of the parties in
a controversy might ask the courts to apply alternative interpretations, including
intentionalist and purposivist interpretations.93 At the time Congress was
considering CISA, the Congressional Research Service prepared a detailed
87. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 49.
88. 6 U.S.C. § 1505; NOLAN, supra note 3, at 50.
89. 6 U.S.C. § 1501(13).
90. See supra Subpart I.C.2 (detailing the data sharing schemes authorized under CISA).
91. See supra note 84 for a brief discussion regarding the lack of cases citing to CISA, hence this
interpretation that would preclude any authorization for the sharing or sending of ROD has yet to be argued or
disputed before the courts.
92. LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 80–85 (Carolina Academic Press ed., 2d
ed. 2013).
93. Id. at 197–229.
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report providing perspective on an escalating cybersecurity risk landscape, on
the existing legal framework supporting the sharing of cyber threat intelligence
or lack thereof, and on the features of various proposed alternative legislative
options considered.94 While the report illustrates a thoughtful approach in
determining the types of data to be shared, such as CTIs and DMs at the
exclusion of ROD,95 the report offers little to no insight regarding the various
possible interpretations of the act of monitoring, rendering an intentionalist
interpretation fruitless.
The courts may further seek meaning through an interpretation of the
purpose of the statute as may be inferred from the broader context of its passage.
Citing examples of recent prominent breaches, Congressional materials
suggested that the “stated priorities of the President and congressional leadership
[was] to enact laws that ensure that both the public and private sector are
prepared to meet the cyber-challenges of the future.”96 Given such a broad
mission and scope, one could be tempted to apply an equally broad interpretation
of the definition of monitoring. However, the risks to privacy under such a
wholesale data sharing authorization would be so great, even if limited to
cybersecurity purposes only, that the courts would likely dismiss that
interpretation. Therefore, as intentionalist and purposivist interpretations
provide little to no additional guidance, we are left with the unsatisfying
textualist interpretation defined above.
The resulting gap in explicit authorization for the sending of ROD creates
a corresponding gap in the immunity afforded to NFEs under CISA.97 In the
absence of the immunity afforded by CISA, an NFE could have incurred liability
under the Sherman Antitrust Act for acts of sharing CTIs containing IOCs
identifying third-parties with whom the NFE perceived risk of communication.98
The sharing of ROD, on the other hand, which is void of the negative judgment
inherent to CTIs, poses minimal risks under the Sherman Antitrust Act, but risks
of actions brought under federal and state privacy laws remain. This lack of
immunity for the sending of ROD under CISA effectively precludes those

94. See generally NOLAN, supra note 3.
95. In its assessment of available options, the report suggests that
The broadest approach is epitomized by bills like the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014
(CISA), which would allow entities to share information about (1) cyber-vulnerabilities, (2) cyberthreats [together CTIs], and (3) broader efforts and strategies that have been used to prevent or
mitigate cyberattacks, encompassing nearly any type of information within an entity’s possession
that merely pertains to cybersecurity [or DMs]. A more narrow approach would be that of proposals
like the (CTSA), which allows public and private entities to share only limited types of cyber-threat
information and does not contemplate entities sharing cybersecurity strategies [or DMs] with each
other.
Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 3.
97. See infra Subpart II.B (outlining the impact such ambiguity has on the private sector’s willingness to
share data for cybersecurity purposes).
98. See supra Subpart I.C.3.
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activities except in the narrow circumstance of authorized third-party
monitoring.
II. THE POST-CISA CYBERSECURITY CONTEXT AND THE ADVENT OF AI
The post-CISA facts do not bode well for Internet security. In the words of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in March 2017:
The serious and growing number of cyber threats has been the subject of
significant [Intelligence] Committee oversight and extensive testimony from
senior [Committee] officials. The Committee has reviewed many troubling
cybersecurity incidents and focused considerable attention on malicious
actors’ efforts in cyberspace to inflict harm in the short term, and to intensify
their capabilities over the long term. . . . Foreign cyber actors have stolen
sensitive U.S. national security information and valuable commercial
information for intelligence purposes and economic gain. The Committee has
noted with growing concern a trend in cyber activity: intrusions into sensitive
government systems and critical infrastructure. The potential for a disruptive
or destructive attack on our infrastructure continues to be one of the most
significant cyber threats facing the United States.99

While the committee’s assessment may sound dire, post-CISA cyber
events suggest much work is left to be done to ensure the security of service
providers and users alike.
A. AN ESCALATING CYBER THREAT LANDSCAPE
1.

Cyber-Attacks Are Expanding in Size and Scope

The illicit acts of cyber-criminals and belligerent nation-state actors in
cyberspace seem poised to continue. The authorizations afforded by CISA seem
to have had a muted effect, if any, on the cyber-crimes committed. Although we
cannot know how much damage would have otherwise been allowed absent the
passage of CISA, “[t]he private sector continues to be plagued by cyber incidents
ranging from systems hacking to poor practices that leave companies’
information exposed. In the U.S. alone, the financial loss from cybercrimes
exceeded $1.3 billion in 2016.”100 Focusing exclusively on technical
cybersecurity, as opposed to content-based information security risks,101 notable
examples of cyber-attacks reported during the past two years include the Yahoo

99. S. REP. NO. 115-13, at 2 (2017).
100. Riley Walters, Issue Brief: Private Sector Cyber Incidents in 2017, HERITAGE FOUND., (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/IB4803.pdf.
101. Leonhard Kreuzer, Disentangling the Cyber Security Debate, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (June 20, 2018),
https://intr2dok.vifa-recht.de/receive/mir_mods_00003762 (differentiating between technical cybersecurity, a
function necessary to protect the computing systems and networks of an organization, and content-based cyberrisks, which are best illustrated by fake news and influence campaigns in social media).
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email breach,102 expanded North Korean attacks,103 the Equifax breach,104 and
the most devastating cyber-attack in history—NotPetya.105
Most organizations now transact using the Internet, almost universally
collecting data about their customers in amounts proportional to their level of
success. That collected data provides an increasingly attractive target for
nefarious actors looking to profit from acts of data theft. This conundrum
suggests that conducting a successful business will almost invariably lead to
criminal intrusion attempts,106 some through virtually any means possible.107
Therefore, as long as organizations continue to expand their use of the Internet
to deliver services to their users, every effort must be made to improve the
security profile of their systems and networks. Given the post-CISA acceleration
of cyber-crimes, achieving such improvements will likely require a stepfunction in the effectiveness of cyber-defenses.
102. In 2016, shortly after the enactment of CISA, we learned about the 2013 Yahoo email data breach that
compromised every single Yahoo, Tumblr, Fantasy, and Flickr account—three billion in all. Selena Larson,
Every Single Yahoo Account Was Hacked—3 Billion in All, CNN (Oct. 4, 2017, 6:36 AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/03/technology/business/yahoo-breach-3-billion-accounts/index.html. Although
Yahoo disclosed some information about the attack in 2016, the public did not learn of the full impact of that
attack until months after Verizon had completed its acquisition of Yahoo. Id.
103. Following on its brazen attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment, see Sony Pictures, supra note 52,
through its agents, the North Korean government continued a campaign of cyber-attacks against a variety of
victims largely for financial gain. See Criminal Complaint, supra note 51, at 3 (“[There was allegedly a] wideranging, multi-year conspiracy to conduct computer intrusions and commit wire fraud by co-conspirators
working on behalf of the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”). These included the
release of the WannaCry global ransomware and the cyber-heist of the bank of Bangladesh. Id. at 4–5. Despite
what appears as a collaborative relationship between President Trump and the North Korean leader, in September
2018, “[t]he U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) . . . sanctioned one
entity and one individual tied to the Government of North Korea’s malign cyber activities.” Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Targets North Korea for Multiple Cyber-Attacks (Sept. 6, 2018)
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm473.
104. In 2017, one of the three nationwide credit bureaus that collect and report on consumers financial
worthiness was the target of a cyber-attack that exposed the private financial data of up to 143 million people.
“The attack on the company represents one of the largest risks to personally sensitive information in recent years,
and is the third major cybersecurity threat for the agency since 2015.” Tara Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Says
Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html.
105. Allegedly developed and released by the Russian military in June 2017, this cyber-attack was the most
devastating in history. Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in
History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russiacode-crashed-the-world/. Originally aimed at Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, “[w]ithin hours of its first
appearance, the [NotPetya] worm raced beyond Ukraine and out to countless machines around the world, from
hospitals in Pennsylvania to a chocolate factory in Tasmania.” Id. “The result was more than $10 billion in total
damages, according to a White House assessment confirmed to WIRED by former Homeland Security adviser
Tom Bossert, who at the time of the attack was President Trump’s most senior cybersecurity-focused official.”
Id.
106. See Not If, but When, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS (CSG Fiscal & Econom. Dev. Policy Program, Wash.,
D.C.), July/Aug. 2017, https://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/enews/cs17_1.aspx.
107. E.g., Elizabeth Weise & Chris Woodyard, Home Depot: Card Breach Put 56M Cards at Risk, USA
TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/09/18/home-depot-credit-card-breach-56-million/
15843181/ (last updated Sept. 19, 2014) (detailing the extraordinary efforts and creativity hackers exerted in
order to penetrate Home Depot’s computer systems).
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Ever-Evolving Cyber-Attack Designs

Continually looking to improve the effectiveness of cyber-attacks, cybercriminals and nation-state actors evolve their techniques and intrusion
technologies. For decades, the introduction of malicious code, through one
means or another, has been a common and successful form of cyber-attack.
Therefore, any robust cybersecurity infrastructure naturally included an antivirus detection capability that would examine files on an organization’s systems
or networks to detect malicious code,108 the most effective means of detecting
cyber-attacks that required some form of code execution on the target
organization’s systems.109 The year 2017 saw the advent of malware-less cyberattacks, which are enabled through existing, authorized code execution pathways
and no longer require the introduction of a file containing malicious code into
the target organization’s systems to be effective.110 This new type of cyberattack introduces another dimension of risk to organizations’ systems and
networks, as the anti-virus detection capabilities organizations have so heavily
relied on may become obsolete.
B. LIABILITY CONCERNS INHIBIT INTELLIGENCE SHARING
Adding to the increasing frequency and strength of cyber-attacks,
organizations appear to fail to leverage the intelligence sharing schemes
available to them under CISA. Despite the fact that cyber “[t]hreat intelligence
sharing is believed to improve the security posture of organizations and the
nation’s critical infrastructure,”111 “potential liability . . . keep[s] some
organizations from fully participating.”112 It is unclear whether these concerns
are due to a lack of understanding of the legal immunity provided by CISA for
the sharing of CTIs and DMs, or due to the ambiguity in the types of data for
which CISA provides authorization. For example, if an NFE has logged a list of
IOCs but has yet to draft complex CTI data structures for these IOCs, that NFE
would likely be liable if one of its cyber-analysts chose to share that list with a
peer NFE as these would not be properly formatted CTIs. Such ambiguities
likely have some measure of chilling effect on any non-CTI and non-DM—in
other words, ROD—sharing among NFEs since such sharing is technically not
authorized under CISA. As a result, as long as the cybersecurity community’s
understanding of the immunity afforded to NFEs for their acts of sharing does
not improve, the effectiveness of the intelligence sharing authorized by CISA
will likely remain muted. Moreover, as the most likely interpretation of the CISA

108. See supra Subpart I.A.1.
109. See supra note 32.
110. Michael Viscuso, What Is a Non-Malware (or Fileless) Attack?, CMWARE CARBON BLACK (Feb. 10,
2017), https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/02/10/non-malware-fileless-attack/.
111. PONEMON INST., THIRD ANNUAL STUDY ON EXCHANGING CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE: THERE HAS
TO BE A BETTER WAY 4 (2018).
112. Id. at 5.
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text suggests no immunity is afforded to NFEs for the sharing of ROD,113 it is
even more likely that little to no ROD will be shared among NFEs except the
ROD collected by third-party cybersecurity firms authorized to monitor other
NFEs’ networks.
As a result, NFEs have limited choices. Analogizing again to castle
defenses, one option is for NFEs to collect their own ROD, with the limited
visibility afforded from their own castle walls, and to analyze that ROD by
further enriching it with the cyber threat intelligence provided through CTIs and
DMs received from other castle owners or through fee-based cyber threat
intelligence data feeds. NFEs choosing this option would not directly benefit
from the ROD collected from the walls of neighboring castles; thus, their
analyses would lack the perspective of footprints left in the snow at or around
those neighboring castles. This option is equivalent to castle defenders being
limited to line-of-sight visibility and to reports received from allies who have
successfully identified nefarious actors (CTIs) and how to defend against them
(DMs), a process fraught with shortcomings such as limited allies, likely time
delays in the development and delivery of reports, and generally poor situational
awareness.
Alternatively, NFEs could authorize third-party cybersecurity firms to
monitor their respective information systems and networks with the expectation
that those firms will have superior aggregate visibility. In that case,
cybersecurity firms are akin to feudal lords providing protection to a network of
castles, benefiting from the aggregate intelligence derived from the analysis of
ROD collected across the network of castle defenses for which they are
responsible. Cybersecurity firms, in turn, leverage the cyber threat intelligence
developed through this aggregation of ROD as a competitive advantage to attract
new clients.114 Unfortunately, these strategies then preclude such firms from
freely sharing the CTIs and DMs so derived, as these have become part of these
firms’ value proposition.
The net effect of such limited ROD sharing, therefore, is that NFEs are
either limited to the perspective available from their own castle walls, or enjoy
the expanded perspective and protection offered by a cybersecurity firm. The
latter certainly allows the limited number of clients of a given cybersecurity firm
to leverage the value of collected ROD, but that leverage of value is generally
limited to the finite number of clients of that cybersecurity firm and no more.
C. THE ADVENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The challenges associated with the acceleration of cyber-attacks, the
evolution of cyber threats, and the chilled participation in cyber threat
113. See supra Subpart I.C.4 (explaining the reason to conclude CISA does not authorize the sharing of
ROD among NFEs or between NFEs and the federal government).
114. E.g., FireEye Threat Intelligence: The Difference Between Informing Your Business and Informing an
Appliance, FIREEYE, https://www.fireeye.com/solutions/cyber-threat-intelligence.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2020).
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intelligence sharing together present a daunting challenge to Internet security.
The advent of AI and the leverage of such technologies by nefarious actors will
likely accelerate and amplify these risks. Therefore, despite the news headlines
being filled with references to AI and its positive implications to our daily lives,
for the purpose of this Note it is important to understand the basic attributes of
AI systems and their potential applications to the domain of cybersecurity.
1.

From Chronically Emerging to Ubiquitous

In his recent book entitled AI Super-Powers: China, Silicon Valley, and the
New World Order, Dr. Kai-Fu Lee details the history of AI research since his
days as a doctoral candidate at Carnegie Mellon University in the 1980s, the
struggles AI researchers had to overcome to produce useful technologies, and
the implications of societies’ broad adoption of AI for today and tomorrow.115
Dr. Lee is the Chairman and CEO of Sinovation Ventures and President of
Sinovation Venture’s Artificial Intelligence Institute. Prior to founding
Sinovation in 2009, Dr. Lee led Google China as its President and had previously
held executive positions at Microsoft, SGI, and Apple.116
Research into artificial intelligence started as early as the 1950s, the dawn
of the computer age.117 By the 1980s, “the field of [AI] had forked into two
camps: the ‘rule-based’ approach and the ‘neural networks’ approach.”118 The
former attempted to “teach computers to think by encoding a series of logical
rules,” whereas the latter attempted to simulate the human brain itself, enabling
computers to learn from exposure to “lots and lots of examples of a given
phenomenon.”119 Unfortunately, for decades both of these approaches were
plagued by resource constraints.120
“What ultimately resuscitated the field of neural networks . . . were
changes to two of the key raw ingredients that neural networks feed on, along
with one major technical breakthrough.”121 “Neural networks require large
amounts of two things: computing power and data.”122 The latter provides the
numerous examples the neural network needs to learn from, and the former
provides the power to sift through those numerous examples.123 Both data and
computing power were historically in short supply, but today our smartphones
provide millions of times more processing power than NASA used to put Neil
Armstrong on the moon, and the Internet activity of billions of users has led to
115.
(2018).
116.
2020).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See generally KAI-FU LEE, AI SUPER-POWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
About Dr. Lee, AI SUPERPOWERS, https://aisuperpowers.com/about/about-dr-lee (last visited Jan. 24,
LEE, supra note 115, at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
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an explosion of available data.124 Moreover, the wide adoption of the Internet
for daily use has dramatically increased the amount and variety of data available
to data scientists as “[m]ore data has been created in the past two years than in
the entire previous history of mankind.”125 In parallel, scientists achieved a
significant breakthrough in neural network technology with vastly more efficient
computer training capabilities.126 These advances in infrastructure, data
availability, and efficiency in computer training have set the stage for an
explosion in the applications of AI across a range of industries including
cybersecurity.
2.

Neural Networks and Deep Learning

If a neural network is designed to learn like a human and to exhibit humanlike behavior once taught, then it must be trained by exposing it, like a human,
to vast amounts of data thus transforming it into a functional AI system.127 When
the learning is focused on a very specific domain, such as voice recognition, data
scientists will apply deep learning training techniques to further improve the
effectiveness of the AI system.128
Deep learning “use[s] massive amounts of data from a specific domain to
make a decision that optimizes for a desired outcome. It does this by training
itself to recognize deeply buried patterns and correlations connecting the many
data points to the desired outcome.”129
Doing this requires massive amounts of relevant data, a strong algorithm, a
narrow domain, and a concrete goal. If you’re short any one of these, things fall
apart. Too little data? The algorithm doesn’t have enough examples to uncover
meaningful correlations. Too broad a goal? The algorithm lacks clear
benchmarks to shoot for in optimization.130

An obvious and desirable application of neural networks and deep learning
is to the detection of movements and actions of nefarious actors within an
organization’s network and across multiple organizations’ environments.
3.

Application of AI to Cybersecurity

“AI-based technologies provide deeper security than what humans alone
can provide . . . [and t]he deployment of AI-based security technologies
simplifies the process of detecting and responding to application security threats
124. Id.
125. John W. Baker & Steve Henderson, The Cyber Data Science Process, 2 CYBER DEF. REV. 47, 47
(2017).
126. LEE, supra note 115, at 9.
127. See Bernard Marr, What Is the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning?,
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/12/06/what-is-thedifference-between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/#7963062f2742.
128. Bernard Marr, What Is the Difference Between Deep Learning, Machine Learning and AI?, FORBES
(Dec. 8, 2016, 2:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/12/08/what-is-the-differencebetween-deep-learning-machine-learning-and-ai/#3c9596fd26cf.
129. LEE, supra note 115, at 10.
130. Id.
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and vulnerabilities.”131 But given the nature of deep learning, its application to
cybersecurity requires that very large amounts of raw evidence of system and
network activity be made available to neural networks. This data is necessary to
train neural networks to understand normal behavior in an organization’s
network, a baseline from which the AI system could then differentiate
anomalous events associated with network breaches.
In light of AI’s promise of improved efficiency and effectiveness in the
hunt for cyber threats, an explosion of AI-based cybersecurity solutions is being
brought to market by cybersecurity vendors, large and small.132 However, “AIbased technologies improve [cyber]security but will not reduce the need for
staff. Working together, AI and IT security personnel can have a positive impact
on organizations’ cybersecurity posture,”133 but AI is unlikely to solve the
critical shortage of cybersecurity expertise.134 As a result, while AI may present
one element of the solution needed to stem the acceleration of post-CISA cyberattacks, further investment in the number and skills of cyber-analysts will
continue to be required.135
4.

AI-Enabled Cyber Threats

“While AI may be the best hope for slowing the tide of cyber-attacks and
breaches, it may also create more advanced attacker tactics in the short-term,”136
hence AI presents itself as a double-edged sword to the cybersecurity
community. “Sixty-two percent of surveyed [2017 Blackhat]137 attendees
believe that there is a high possibility that AI could be used by hackers for
offensive purposes” by the end of 2018.138 “In fact, as cybercriminals and nationstates begin using AI to increase the rate of attacks, the need for smarter solutions
that can help human security teams keep up will only become more apparent.”139

131. PONEMON INST., THE VALUE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN CYBERSECURITY 4 fig.2 (2018).
132. E.g., Lily Hay Newman, AI Can Help Cybersecurity—If It Can Fight Through the Hype, WIRED (Apr.
29, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-machine-learning-cybersecurity/ (characterizing the
availability of AI-based cybersecurity solutions at the RSA security conference, the largest global conference
dedicated to commercial cybersecurity solutions).
133. Id.
134. See infra Subpart II.D (outlining the critical shortage in trained cyber-analysts affecting organizations’
ability to protect themselves).
135. See infra Subpart II.D.
136. The Cylance Team, Black Hat Attendees See AI as a Double-Edged Sword, THREATVECTOR:
SPOTLIGHT (Aug. 1, 2017), https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/black-hat-attendees-see-ai-as-doubleedged-sword.html.
137. “Black Hat is the most technical and relevant information security event series in the world. For more
than 20 years, Black Hat Briefings have provided attendees with the very latest in information security research,
development, and trends in a strictly vendor-neutral environment.” About Us, BLACK HAT,
https://www.blackhat.com/about.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
138. The Cylance Team, supra note 136.
139. Id.
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Unfortunately, nefarious actors in cyberspace are learning to weaponize AI
to serve their illicit purposes.140 “AI can make attacks very evasive, very
targeted, and . . . bring an entire[ly] new scale and speed to attacks, with
reasoning, and with autonomous approaches that can be built into attacks to
work completely independently from the attackers.”141 Therefore, while AI can
serve the purpose of improving efficiency and accuracy in detecting cyberattacks, we already know that AI can make attacks significantly more effective
and accurate, and potentially more devastating.
[T]he 9/11 Commission report characterized the failures that led to that attack
on our country as a “failure of imagination.” . . . [T]he failure to detect and
disrupt the Russian government’s weaponization of online platforms against
the United States and our allies [could be characterized as] . . . a similar
failure to imagine.142

Our nation has the opportunity, now, to address the cyber-risks associated with
AI, but time is of the essence.
D. CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF CYBERSECURITY EXPERTISE
As cyber-risks escalate, organizations are increasing their commitments to
their respective cyber-defenses, causing the number of cybersecurity jobs to
more than triple over the next five years.143 In fact, “[a]ccording to one estimate,
by 2021 an estimated 3.5 million cybersecurity jobs will be unfilled. And of the
candidates who apply, fewer than one in four are even qualified.”144 A survey of
Chief Information Security Officers indicates that “[a]utomation improves
cybersecurity posture but does not reduce the need for in-house expertise. Sixtytwo percent of respondents say automation, [including] artificial
intelligence[,] . . . is not going to reduce the need for IT expertise but will
enhance the productivity and effectiveness of skilled staff.”145
III. CISA AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
Given the chronic shortage of skilled cybersecurity analysts, unless
something dramatic changes in the degree of automation and efficacy of
cybersecurity solutions, the risks to organizations’ systems and networks are
140. See Dan Patterson, How Weaponized AI Creates a New Breed of Cyber-Attacks, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug.
16, 2018, 9:25 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-weaponized-ai-creates-a-new-breed-of-cyberattacks/.
141. Id.
142. Foreign Influence Operations and Their Use of Social Media Platforms: Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Laura Rosenberger, Alliance for Securing Democracy,
the German Marshall Fund of the United States).
143. Steve Morgan, Cybersecurity Talent Crunch to Create 3.5 Million Unfileld Jobs Globally by 2021,
CYBERCRIME MAG. (Oct. 24, 2019), https://cybersecurityventures.com/jobs/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
144. Erin Winick, A Cyber-Skills Shortage Means Students Are Being Recruited to Fight Off Hackers, MIT
TECH. REV. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612309/a-cyber-skills-shortage-meansstudents-are-being-recruited-to-fight-off-hackers/?source=download-metered-content (citing Morgan, supra
note 143).
145. PONEMON INST., SEPARATING THE TRUTHS FROM THE MYTHS IN CYBERSECURITY 5 (2018).

528

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:501

only likely to escalate from current levels. AI can play an important role in
addressing these concerns, at least in part, but Congress must decide the quality
and quantity of data that will be made available to cyber-analysts to enable their
AI-powered cyber-defenses.
A cyber-attack is rarely, if ever, a singular frontal attack against an
organization’s cyber-defenses. Instead, would-be cyber-criminals apply
malicious reconnaissance, enumeration, penetration, exfiltration, and sanitation
techniques,146 for which stealth is a critical success factor. Importantly, and in
keeping with military tactics, if a cyber-analyst could improve her situational
awareness by extending her visibility to her virtual neighbors’ castle walls in
addition to her own,147 then that analyst’s ability to observe would-be attackers’
movements and tactics would dramatically improve her chances of detecting and
inhibiting that would-be attacker’s actions at her own castle defenses. It could
be very tempting to suggest that a cyber-analyst could just wait for her neighbors
to publish CTIs and DMs based on their own perspective, but it is sometimes
through the accumulation of observations across environments that one can
finally discern modus operandi and attack patterns of a would-be nefarious actor.
A. AUTHORIZING ROD SHARING AMONG NFES
While AI is not positioned to completely displace humans in cybersecurity
roles, it has become a very effective tool for detecting anomalies in massive
amounts of data based on established patterns of normalcy, the very essence of
cyber-attack detection.148 AI can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
cybersecurity solutions, but only if these solutions are afforded the necessary
data from which to learn.149 Hence, Congress should amend CISA, authorizing
NFEs to share ROD150 among themselves with the same civil and criminal
immunity currently afforded by CISA for the sharing of CTIs and DMs. Doing
so would be tantamount to shining bright lights on all the footsteps in the snow
left at or near all the castle defense systems of those choosing to share ROD,
thus allowing cyber-analysts to observe the movements of would-be cybercriminals as they perform pre-attack surveillance, or other suspicious acts,151
before such actors effectively breach their respective castle defenses.

146. ANATOMY OF A CYBER ATTACK: THE LIFECYCLE OF A SECURITY BREACH, ORACLE 4–5 (2017)
(detailing the phases of a cyber-attack and the attackers’ motivation behind each step).
147. See KISSEL, supra note 12, at 185 (“Within a volume of time and space, the perception of an enterprise's
security posture and its threat environment; the comprehension/meaning of both taken together (risk); and the
projection of their status into the near future.”).
148. E.g., Newman, supra note 132 (illustrating how AI is well-adapted to the challenges of detecting
antivirus defense and malware scanning).
149. See supra Subpart II.C.2 (explaining how and why AI deep learning solutions require massive amounts
of topic-specific data in order to be effective).
150. See supra Subpart I.A.3 (analogizing ROD to footprints in the snow left by network and system users,
whether nefarious or not).
151. See ORACLE, supra note 146, at 5.
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The Benefits Outweigh the Risks

In the absence of such a bold data sharing strategy, cyber-analysts will
largely be left to defending their walls, limited to their respective visibility albeit
possibly enriched by cyber threat intelligence received from others.152 The
organizations they aim to protect would continue to be condemned to being
attacked first before pursuing the attackers by following the “breadcrumbs” left
behind, much as certain technologists advocated in their letter to Congress in
dissent to the passage of CISA.153 This more limited strategy, which CISA
affords us today, has proven to be of limited effectiveness in stemming the tide
of cyber-crime.154
On the other hand, while an explicit authorization for NFEs to share ROD
among themselves would enhance their respective situational awareness and
resulting abilities to defend themselves, this recommendation comes at the cost
of reduced privacy for consumers. Although true, this proposal lives at the
tension point between consumer privacy and the protection of the data
consumers deposit in trust with online service providers who are charged with
securing that data. To deny NFEs the access to technologies and supporting data
necessary to thwart modern AI-powered cyber-attacks would render hollow any
calls to those NFEs for securing users’ privacy, as nefarious actors will continue
to prevail in the game of one-upmanship we have observed since the use of the
Internet has gone mainstream.155
2.

ROD Is Already Defined in the CISA Data Sharing Specification

The utility of ROD to cyber-analysts is nothing new. The DHS adopted
STIX/TAXII as the technical specification for the CTI/DM data sharing
requirements of CISA.156 The version of that specification in general release at
the time of the enactment of CISA did not include the notion of ROD,157 except
as an extension of a CTI data structure.158 As of July 2017, ROD is now defined
as its own type of data on equal footing with CTIs and DMs in the STIX 2.0
specification.159 While the authors of the STIX 2.0 specification might not have
necessarily envisioned the level of ROD sharing recommended herein, the utility

152. See supra Subpart II.B (explaining the consequences of lack of ROD sharing).
153. Letter from Ben Adida et al., supra note 67, at 1.
154. See supra Subpart II.A (providing an overview of the escalating cyber-crime landscape).
155. See supra Subparts I.B.1, II.A (providing a pre- and post-CISA overview of the cyber-crime
landscape).
156. DHS & DOJ, supra note 24, at 3.
157. STIX Release Archive, MITRE CORP., https://stixproject.github.io/releases/archive/ (last visited Jan. 24,
2020) (showing May 15, 2015 as the release date for STIX 1.2).
158. STIX 1.2, MITRE CORP., https://stixproject.github.io/releases/1.2/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (detailing
the object classes included in the STIX 1.2 specification including the Indicator class (CTIs) but lacking the
Observed Data class (ROD)).
159. STIX™ Version 2.0. Part 2: STIX Objects, OASIS (July 19, 2017), http://docs.oasisopen.org/cti/stix/v2.0/cs01/part2-stix-objects/stix-v2.0-cs01-part2-stix-objects.html#_Toc496714322
(showing, in sections 2.5 and 2.8, the Indicator and Observed Data class definitions, respectively).
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of ROD to cyber-analysts was sufficient to elevate it to its own data object class
within the STIX 2.0 specification.
3.

The Federal Government Should Be Excluded from Receiving ROD

Under CISA, only NFEs are authorized to monitor the systems and
networks of other NFEs or federal entities who have granted authorization for
that monitoring.160 By implication, the federal government is not authorized to
monitor NFEs’ systems and networks, and therefore does not have access to
NFEs’ ROD. This design choice supports a sound privacy argument, and privacy
advocates likely argued for that limitation in the wake of the Snowden
Disclosures.161 For like reasons, the federal government should be excluded
from any ROD sharing schemes under this proposal, leaving it no worse off than
with the current CISA statute, still able to receive and share CTIs and DMs but
not ROD.
4.

ROD Sharing Is in the Public Interest

Sharing more personal data than is already authorized under CISA has deep
privacy implications, and finding the appropriate balance of privacy parameters
for the implementation of this recommendation is not without its challenges. The
tension between the desire to maximize the public good of Internet safety and
the robust protection of privacy rights is hardly unique to the domain of
cybersecurity. In fact, similar tension is evidenced in tech giants’ adoption of AI
in the broader technology sense.162 As the AngelList Weekly has described:
The competition among tech giants over AI isn’t just an arms race—it’s a
battle of philosophies. On one side, companies like Google—despite taking
PR hits over user privacy concerns—are focused on providing the most
ubiquitous, accessible AI-powered services. Their bet: Ease of use and
accessibility will outweigh consumer privacy concerns. Others, like Apple,
take the opposite stance, betting a strong focus on privacy will continue to be
a differentiating factor for consumers.163

A similar battle of philosophies could be at play in response to this Note’s
recommendation.
U.S. decision-makers have not yet confronted the necessity to make PII
available to cyber-analysts to ensure public Internet safety. However, Drs. Clare
Sullivan and Eric Burger, Georgetown University researchers in law and
computer science, respectively, have analyzed the tension between public
Internet safety and privacy rights with respect to the sharing of IP addresses (a
very specific kind of cyber-relevant ROD) in the context of the European
160. See supra Subpart I.C.2.
161. See Macaskill & Dance, supra note 59.
162. Apple’s Quiet AI Acquisition, ANGELLIST WKLY (ANGELLIST, San Francisco, California), Nov. 21,
2018, https://angel.co/newsletters/apple-s-quiet-ai-acquisition-112118?email_uid=853898960&utm_campaign
=platform-newsletter-112118&utm_content=view-online&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletternewsletter&utm_term=.
163. Id.
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General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)164 and its predecessor, the 1995
Directive.165 It can be instructive to study this example because it parallels the
question at hand, i.e., should public Internet safety outweigh the need for
absolute privacy with relation to a very valuable kind of cyber-relevant PII such
as an IP address? In their view,
[T]he sharing of IP addresses as cyber-threat intelligence can be justified in
the public interest under Article 6(1)(e) of the GDPR to which the
notification requirements of Articles 13 and 14 do not apply.166 Sharing of
threat intelligence is in the public interest and that interest overrides the
individual rights of a data subject under Article 8(1)167 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union which underpins the GDPR and
its equivalent in the 1995 Directive as long as the concepts of necessity and
proportionality-of-purpose are adhered to in respect of the design of the
specific measures proposed.168

According to this analysis, European courts would likely rule against
individuals bringing privacy actions against private or public entities logging or
sharing IP addresses for cybersecurity purposes, a necessary response whose
purpose is proportional to the threat, despite the fact that IP addresses may be
considered personal information in certain circumstances.169 Applying this
principle of security-over-privacy to a CISA context, authorizing NFEs to share
ROD containing authorized PII, such as IP addresses,170 should be considered in
the public interest as public Internet safety and the security of online users’
private data should take precedence over their individual rights to privacy.
B. LIMITING PII SHARING THROUGH DATA SEGMENTATION/AUTHORIZATION
Acknowledging the need to respect individual privacy rights while
enabling an effective ROD sharing model, this proposed CISA amendment
should also include provisions for granular PII definitions, segmentation, and
sharing authorization. Unlike the more recently enacted CCPA,171 CISA does
not explicitly define PII other than to require those sharing CTIs or DMs to

164. See generally General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 33.
165. See Clare Sullivan & Eric Burger, “In the Public Interest”: The Privacy Implications of International
Business-to-Business Sharing of Cyber-Threat Intelligence, 33 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 14, 14 (2017).
166. General Data Protection Regulation Article 13 defines certain requirements placed on system operators
for notifying system users when their personal data is being captured from them directly, whereas Article 14
defines certain notification requirements in the event users’ personal data is acquired but not from them directly.
167. A “data subject” is defined as an identified or identifiable natural person. General Data Protection
Regulation, supra note 33.at art. 4, § 1.
168. Sullivan & Burger, supra note 165, at 29.
169. Id. at 22–24 (reviewing a case where a German court dismissed a private citizen’s claim of privacy
infringement, holding that a dynamic IP address is not personal information if the mapping of the address to a
person requires cross-reference information only obtainable from a third-party such as an ISP and therefore not
associated directly with their person).
170. See infra Subpart III.B (outlining a proposal for the segmentation of the types of PII that should be
authorized to be shared as ROD).
171. CCPA § 1798.140(o)(1) (offering a non-exhaustive, yet reasonably complete, list of the types of data
the California legislature considered PII).
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redact information the entity “knows at the time of sharing to be personal
information of a specific individual or information that identifies a specific
individual.”172 This lack of specific PII definition and resulting vagueness in
definition of CTIs and DMs fueled strong dissenting opinions while CISA was
being debated.173
As pertains to cybersecurity, not all PII is made equal. For example, while
IP and email addresses are often prized for their value to cybersecurity analysis,
intimate personal data such as health or financial data rarely are, if ever. The
drafters of the STIX 2.0 specification thought this matter through in detail and
have produced a specification of those types of ROD that are relevant to
cybersecurity analysis as of the release of that specification.174 The use of the
expanded STIX 2.0 specification would be a natural evolution of the CISA data
sharing model as STIX is already defined as the data sharing specification for
data shared through the DHS under CISA.175
Contrary to the existing CISA broad-brush approach, the recommended
amendment should segment PII into two categories: cyber-relevant PII such as
are defined in the STIX 2.0 specification176 and more sensitive PII such as health
and financial information. This improved definition and segmentation of PII
should be made applicable to all types of data being shared under CISA,
including CTIs, DMs, and ROD. This approach would provide much clearer
bright-line rules for the sharing of PII, thus improving NFE participation as a
result of reduced litigation risk and, at the same time, reducing users’ privacy
concerns as they will be more assured that the sharing of their most sensitive
data not necessary to cyber-analysis will be strictly forbidden.
This proposed amendment itself need not be explicit in the definitions and
segmentation of PII. Instead, Congress should direct the DHS, as part of its CISA
stewardship role, to develop and maintain the details regarding PII definitions
and segmentation as a set of regulations under standard APA rule-making

172. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, 6 U.S.C. § 1502(b)(1)(E)(i).
173. One comment letter sent on behalf of many civil society organizations, companies, and security experts
argued that “the definitions for ‘cyber threat,’ and ‘cyber threat indicator,’ [were] concerning because they [were]
unnecessarily broad.” Letter from Access et al., to Barack Obama, Former President of the United States (July
27, 2015), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4459-pr-massive-coalition-of-security-experts-companiesand-civil-society-groups-urge-obama-to-veto-cisa/Final_Coalition%20Ltr%20Urging%20Pres.%20to%20
%20CISA.8b33e2d86dc14780b35c9cde44a41797.pdf (urging President Obama to strongly oppose the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015).
174. STIX™ Version 2.0. Part 4: Cyber Observable Objects, OASIS (July 19, 2017), https://docs.oasisopen.org/cti/stix/v2.0/stix-v2.0-part4-cyber-observable-objects.html (“STIX Cyber Observables document the
facts concerning what happened on a network or host, but not necessarily the who or when, and never the why.
For example, information about a file that existed, a process that was observed running, or that network traffic
occurred between two IPs can all be captured as Cyber Observable data.”). The classes of observable data
included in STIX 2.0 are non-exhaustive. Id. “Objects and properties not included in STIX 2.0, but deemed
necessary by the community, will be included in future releases.” Id.
175. See supra Subpart III.A.2 (detailing the adoption of STIX/TAXII as the technical specification for
sharing data with the DHS under CISA).
176. See supra Subpart III.A.2.
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procedures.177 The non-exhaustive nature of the STIX 2.0 ROD specification
would readily accommodate such a malleable approach to managing the
definitions of various subsets of PII.178
CONCLUSION
CISA has had a muted effect on the continued escalation of cyber-attacks.
Since its passage into law in late 2015, AI has emerged as a powerful technology
capable of performing certain tasks better than humans, including some aspects
of cybersecurity analysis. The value of AI to the execution of mundane tasks has
not escaped the attention of cyber-criminals who have been weaponizing AI to
their own benefit. The drafters of CISA failed to anticipate the data sharing
requirements of AI-powered cybersecurity solutions required to counter this
emerging weaponization. NFEs stand to benefit from expanded CISA data
sharing authorizations to include ROD, allowing their cyber-analysts to gain
vastly improved situational awareness. The proposal herein provides for such an
expanded data sharing scheme among NFEs only, to the exclusion of the federal
government. In an effort to improve the overall privacy profile of CISA, these
recommendations also include a more refined definition and segmentation of PII
and limiting the sharing of PII under CISA to authorized, cyber-relevant PII
only. With these improvements, NFEs will be better equipped to construct the
AI-powered solutions we will need to face tomorrow’s cyber threats.

177. See The
Administrative
Procedure
Act
(APA),
ELEC. PRIVACY
https://epic.org/open_gov/Administrative-Procedure-Act.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
178. See supra note 174.
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